Showing posts with label Regional Theme Park Industry series. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Regional Theme Park Industry series. Show all posts

Saturday, February 10, 2018

What's happening with SeaWorld? Part 2: The Plan?

Prior to discussing what it is SeaWorld is doing and whether or not it is working, let's first summarize Part 1 of this series:

-Busch Entertainment (what is now SeaWorld Entertainment) was acquired by Blackstone in 2009 from InBev, who was seeking to rid themselves of non-core assets of Anheuser-Busch after InBev's hostile takeover of the company. 

-Blackstone and it's investors paid $2.3 billion dollars to InBev; Roughly $1 billion dollars was cash from Blackstone and it's investors, and the remainder was in deferred financing provided by banks. Over the next three years, Blackstone would extract $610 million dollars from SeaWorld in the form of dividends. These dividends came from company profits, cash reserves, and sales of non-core assets.

-In 2013, 3 months after Blackfish made its debut at Sundance, Blackstone made the first public offering of SeaWorld (SEAS). They would sell stock 4 additional times until which time they ceased to have a position with the company. The stock sales and dividends paid over this time period allowed Blackstone to make nearly triple their money back on SEAS, even as the stock faltered in the wake of Blackfish. In addition to sale of stock, the deferred financing now hit the SEAS books as long term debt of roughly 1.5 billion dollars owed to various large banks. 

-SeaWorld's has two debt bubbles which may burst based on debt/EBIDTA ratio and more frighteningly, a maturing note in 2020 which SEAS best option to avoid default on may be selling attempting to sell junk bonds.

-Negative attendance in the wake of Blackfish, potentially lied about by SeaWorld management, led to collapse of share value. Blackstone's last sale of stock was to a Chinese firm (Zhonghong Zhuoye Group) in 2017 who paid in excess of market value for the shares using borrowed money. The company's chief  was embroiled in criminal legal wranglings, and the company's stock has been frozen by Chinese regulators in the months since. 

There's a lot there to grasp, and while there's certainly a lot of financial issues, they're compounded by poor managerial decisions and bad promotion. That's what Part 2 intends to tackle.

Friday, February 9, 2018

What's happening with SeaWorld? Part 1: The Finances

Ever since Blackfish was released, SeaWorld Entertainment has been struggling. Attendance is down dramatically at their Orlando flagship and in San Diego, and attraction closures at their less struggling Busch Gardens facilities are becoming an epidemic. There are investigations, lawsuits, and flat out bad press. Trying to make sense of this in a vacuum would be difficult. The tea leaves on theme park media, meanwhile, are often intentionally impossible to read. Jeff Putz, the man behind Coasterbuzz.com (it mattered more in the pre-social media era) had this to say as someone who wound up doing contract work for the company:

"Now the word comes that the CEO is stepping down, and they're laying off about 300 people across the chain. That's unfortunate, and I think it's an over-reaction (the company is still profitable), but it's also not surprising. Is it because of Blackfish? I don't think you need insider knowledge to know the answer to that question. As someone who has observed the theme park industry for around 15 years, I think it's obviously not that.

.....

I have no idea what they were up against in each of their markets in terms of competing attractions, but that you have to sink some cap ex dollars into theme parks to keep attendance up isn't some secret sauce. Disney, Universal, Six Flags, Cedar Fair and even independent parks like Holiday World get it. That's where SEAS is failing."

Robert Niles at Theme Park Insider instead points at another factor: The loss of free beer.

"Leaving the Anheuser-Busch family not only robbed SeaWorld/Busch Gardens of a corporate owner with deep pockets, it meant the end of the beer giveaways that time has shown might have been the most under-rated attraction at those parks. Without the lure of free beer, the SeaWorld/Busch Gardens parks have been exposed as under-capitalized attractions in generally inconvenient locations near competitive markets, without the hotels and secondary development to support growing attendance, and attraction line-ups that have suffered with too many recent flops."

Niles goes on to argue that theme park fans don't care about animals in the same piece that establishes SeaWorld Orlando as having had an attendance of 5.5 million within recent memory. That's pretty inconsistent as a take, but the general theme continues here that SeaWorld's mistake was not spending more money or that the money was spent poorly on the wrong rides/attractions. For most, this is a satisfactory answer. It's simple enough to grasp and to lots of people makes sense given the popularity of attractions like The Wizarding World of Harry Potter and Cars Land. It even fits well with the popular internet idea that audiences specifically demand "fully immersive" attractions such as this. 

As is often the case on this blog, I often look at issues or topics in the theme park industry that aren't well analyzed. As good an explanation as this is, is it actually the right one? 


Wednesday, January 17, 2018

Regional Theme Park Revenue: How The Industry Makes Money

For many years, I heard a common refrain from industry folks and those on the internet who felt they had been sufficiently smartened up. They claimed that a core reason behind the bankruptcy of Six Flags (SIX) in the late 2000s was that they had "given away the gate": in effect, they had allowed admission at a loss to try and pick up revenue from food and drink sales only to come up desperately short. They fundamentally misunderstood how the theme park industry worked, unlike Cedar Fair (FUN) and others. Considering the number of people who told me this and my respect for them, I generally mimicked it. Why wouldn't it? It made all the sense in the world. But I've gotten older, and gained a lot of real world experience. I've started to come to distrust those in positions of authority. As I worked on my piece related to the theme park labor market, "giving away the gate" came into my mind. Is that true, or just more BS?

So I did what any rational almost-35 year old should presented with such a question: I sought out FEC 10-K filings. 10-K filings are the annual report corporations are to present the Feds to prove that they aren't up to any malfeasance. First up - Six Flags. Low and behold, what appeared to be truth to the claims, as only 54.2% of their revenue in FY 2016 came from admission. But I've been in academia around scientists: you have to repeat that experiment to prove it. So off to Cedar Fair's 10-K to see what they were doing. The answer? 55.6%. A whopping 1.4% difference as a percentage of revenue. The gross admission revenue at Cedar Fair was almost equal to that of Six Flags: it was about a tenth of a percentage short. Neither chain is anywhere near having admission revenue cover operating expenses. I looked at SeaWorld (SEAS) too: 60% of revenue is admission, and they're in the same situation as far as operating expenses. Maybe that's the way things are now. What about in 2001 when Six Flags was steaming full speed towards collapse?



In FY 2004, as SIX had entered its death spiral, they still beat FUN's percentage of revenue derived from admission as a percentage of their overall revenue. Even with notes about discount tickets being distributed in the annual reports, that didn't explain the split being what it was. I was convinced then that the truth was much more obvious: they had abused their clientele until they stopped coming. With the cost of capital expenditures and park purchases being their customer acquisition costs, they had failed to retain anywhere near enough of them cover the interest on the money SIX had borrowed. In 2004, SIX's operations at the park level actually made $149 million dollars. The problem was that they owed $191 million in just loan interest - by the time everything else they owed got added up, SIX's losses totaled almost a half billion dollars, or -$5.23 a share in 2004. What's really amazing is that after all these years and a bankruptcy, the percentages have barely changed. It was time to put down what was real and stop repeating other's feels.


Tuesday, December 19, 2017

Regional Theme Park Industry 101, Part 4: Where and When?

The final part of the Regional Theme Park Industry 101 series is about the future and the new parks coming online one day soon and those ideas that will disappear into the void.

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In the late 2010s, the story about building new parks isn't any different than it was in the 2000s, the 1990s, or even the 1980s. It costs a lot of money. A lot lot. And even though there's multiple markets with huge populations that seem like good places to develop one according to the raw numbers (Phoenix, Miami, Portland OR, Sacramento, Austin), almost no one in the industry wants to build new outside Orlando. And those outside the industry often look at the case studies of past new parks and shy away:

MGM Grand Adventures: 10 seasons attached to one of the largest hotels in the world in a place where it basically never snows; that was the fate of this long lost studio park which ran from 1993 to 2002.

Elitch Gardens: The current Elitch's opened in 1994 on a cleaned up toxic waste site. It was sold a whole two years later.

Wild Adventures: Kent Buescher spent a lot of money expanding the hell out of Wild Adventures (opened in 1996), and then expanding the hell out of Cypress Gardens after he picked it up in a fire sale. The parent company went bankrupt in 2006; Herschend owns it now.

Visionland: Opened for business outside Birmingham, Alabama in 1998, and went bankrupt by 2002.

Bonfante Gardens: Opened in June 2001, attendance never matched expectations, and Paramount came in to operate it in 2003. It was sold to the city of Gilroy, CA in 2008.

Jazzland: Gates were unlocked for the first time in 2000, and it was sold to Six Flags early in 2002 after attendance had dropped by half.

Wild West World: The Kansas themer lasted two months after opening in 2007 and the owner went to federal prison for fraud. Yikes.

Hard Rock Park: Hundreds of millions went into it and went nowhere. It closed early in its debut season of 2008, reopened in 2009 under the name "Freestyle Music Park", and then was shuttered forever.

Islands of Adventure: Wait, really? But IOA didn't change hands, did...oh, it kinda did, didn't it? Yes, IOA was started by MCA, opened by Seagram's, 50% stake purchased by Blackstone in 2000, then merged into French conglomerate Vivendi before winding up with Comcast making it whole again.

That's a whole lot of failures, and you can see why there's not many people rushing to try and replicate that kind of success. But still, all those failures required someone knowing that there were so many developments that ended in tears and still were able to acquire necessary funds. Undoubtedly, someone will manage to do this again. And some are.

THE SURE THINGS




Park at OWA (Foley, Alabama): Backed with Native American casino money and part of a large entertainment/sports development, OWA came out of nowhere when it was announced and opened in mid 2017. The park is full of Zamperla attractions; only Zamperla attractions, in fact. I hope you get a discount when you buy an entire park. According to them, season pass stock ran out way before they expected. Whether that's because they bought preposterously little or because the park is doing great business, you decide.

Legoland New York (Goshen, NY): Merlin managed to get a big chunk of land about an hour away from New York City, and chances are the native parks are chomping their fingernails. The Lego brand is hot and if the park can deliver on the promise for family entertainment, it should have no problem succeeding even as a seasonal venture. Who needs to be concerned are the facilities on the periphery of New York that depend on group sales: Quassy, New Roc City, Lake Compounce, Long Island Adventureland, and Great Escape, just to name a few.



American Dream (Meadowlands, NJ): Much closer than Goshen and indoors, American Dream is the completed vision of the Xanadu project. The same group behind West Edmonton Mall and Mall of America are in charge here, and there's a slate of rides already sold and getting ready for install ahead of a 2019 opening. Since the exterior is all done, this is a safe bet to open.

THE MAYBES

Grand Texas Theme Park
(New Caney, TX): A karting track and RV park have opened during the 7-8 years that have passed since the park was announced for metro Houston. It may be another 7-8 before we see a real theme park to go with it. Earth is moving again, potentially for a water park (so they claim), but Big Rivers Water Park has also been many years in the making with millions spent on roads, plumbing, and electrical line leading to nowhere...yet. Of the future projects, this is still the one with by far the most potential.

Adventure Pointe (Texas City, TX): Staying right in the greater Houston area, we've got Adventure Pointe. This is not going to be a big park by any stretch of the imagination: it will be similar to the only significant new themed developments of the last 20 years to succeed with the ownership group that built them. I'm talking about the Fertitta's properties in this market: Galveston Historic Pleasure Pier, Kemah Boardwalk, and Downtown Aquarium. There's some big ol' iron flat rides at these parks, an outstanding wooden roller coaster, and two of the most complex train attractions you'll ever see. Just look:


Adventure Pointe mixes retail, shopping, and rides. And unlike Grand Texas, there's actually stuff installed. Most notably, a one mile train loop that will go around the entire property. There's also concept art that is helpful for guidance:



In it, we can see a few flat rides like some form of a Polyp and an interactive Heege tower (riders pull themselves up on ropes and then descend: Dollywood and the Legoland parks have these). There's also what has been revealed to be a go-kart track as part of the complex. Zamperla is known to be supplying three rides, but it is still unknown precisely what all of them are. And of course the second piece of art clearly indicates that the train will have a "show scene" located under the "rapids ride." While updates post-hurricanes have been sparse, it is hoped that the facility may open in 2018 or 2019.

LONG SHOTS




Dreamport Villages (Casa Grande, AZ): Way below most people's radar is this proposed and semi-approved to be developed park south of Phoenix. It's here in the "Long Shots" area as there are still hurdles related to construction of roads and the whole "It's a $4 billion dollar development" aspect. A 60+ acre indoor park and a 163 acre "coaster park" are slated as part of the development. One of the attractions discussed is a 400 mph hyperloop style people mover called the Velocitator intended as a proof of concept for its maker (president? actor Matthew Modine). That's pretty wild stuff.

Parkscope's crack investigation squad of one (me) took a look at the particulars to see what there was to be gleaned from the developers names. Ronald Segall is listed as the lead manager for the project and for Block Sports; he's listed as a manager on 20 corporations filed in the state of Florida in the last 20 years. Among the people he's shown to be working with are Phil Ruggieri of IDEAS and zip line operator innovator Karry Gemmell, as well as a rated "F" by the Better Business Bureau pool construction company and the company built around this children's book that has Paris Jackson (yes, Michael Jackson's kid) on the cover and supposedly contracted for multiple films which never happened. Mr. Segall passed the bar in the state of Florida and went to the University of Miami's Law School, before becoming part of what appears to be the family real estate development business now run by his brother (?), Sandy. They've developed some reasonably sized stuff, but I admit some concern about seeing Aulani and Disneyland Tokyo appearing in their slide shows as "experience".

Whirligig Woods (Saxapahaw, NC) Bob Baranick had a long run in the theme park industry doing design work: now he wants to give back and produce a park for rural North Carolina. Locals were outraged that he hadn't talked with them first so that he could be told he was a bad man for altering their small bubble, and he's a long way from obtaining necessary funding.



Dream Landing Adventure Park (Biloxi, MS? New Orleans, LA?): Danny Rogers made a name for himself with various schemes to rebuild Six Flags New Orleans, and by golly he's still at it, this time along with a plan to build an amusement park in Biloxi by next Spring. He's managed to get into it with people on various forums who question his methods and honesty, and I don't even know if there's a real audience still watching now in 2017. I don't know what if any applicable experience he actually has. Maybe none. But that's what theme park development in this era usually looks like: electronic panhandling by men with such obscure histories, they can't possibly be researched.


Monday, December 18, 2017

Regional Theme Park Industry 101, Part 3: Who?

The first and second parts of Regional Park 101 explained the history of the regional theme parks in the US and described how they came to be and why the way they are. This third part describes the owner and operators both big and small:

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THE DOMESTIC BIG BOYS:




Six Flags

Market Cap (12/17/17): 5.6 Billion Dollars

Number of Properties: 20

Theme Parks owned/operated & Market Served:

Great Escape (NYC, CT), La Ronde (Montreal), Six Flags America (DC), Six Flags Discovery Kingdom (San Francisco), Six Flags Fiesta Texas (San Antonio), Six Flags Great Adventure (NYC/Philadelphia), Six Flags Great America (Chicago, Milwaukee), Six Flags Magic Mountain (Los Angeles), Six Flags México (Mexico City), Six Flags New England (Boston, Providence, CT), Six Flags Over Georgia (Atlanta), Six Flags Over Texas (Dallas), Six Flags St. Louis (St. Louis)

Even after bankruptcy, Six Flags is still the biggest regional operator based within the United States. It's hard to believe as big as they are that they were once twice as big as they are now, but that's what a shaky business plan and expanding too fast too soon does to you. The chain has retained a presence in 9 of the 10 largest media markets in America; that they aren't a perfect 10 for 10 is why we'll see Kieran Burke appear later on the list. The company has been doing gangbusters business since emerging from Chapter 11, more than doubling their stock price in the last 5 years and currently operating at an all time high of 66.90 as of Friday's market close.

INSIDE BASEBALL BIZ BIZ BIZ TALK:

Often when you see people try to describe what happened to Six Flags in the 2000s, one item brought up consistently is the low season pass pricing that "gave away the gate" - in order to drive return traffic and increase visitation to other parks, Story and Burke had super cheap season passes that were often similar or identical in price to one day admission. Those who point to this as a failing show that per capita spending decreased significantly over time and the parks became glorified day care centers for poor families, making them unappealing for anyone else. Ergo, they crashed and burned. In these darkest days, season passes accounted for roughly 1/3 of admissions to the Six Flags parks per press releases and SEC documentation.

Jim Reid-Anderson, corporate raider supreme, has retaken the mantle of CEO after a brief retirement. Historically, he's been incredibly successful with every business he's touched, and Six Flags has to date been no different. Successful businessmen often find things that their predecessors were right about, but go about them differently to achieve actual success. Season pass sales was exactly this thing: rather than increase the price dramatically to push people out of possessing them, Six Flags went the opposite route and kept them at similar or even lower price levels than before, then began to tag on a number of "pluses" which could be assumed as advance revenue. Parking passes had always existed, but Six Flags made them a cornerstone of early pass sale promotions which were often tied to new ride announcements. Then came Season Dining Plans. Then came Season Drink Plans. Then Season Photo Plans to record those special memories. Then Season QBot to skip the lines every time you go. By 2017, season pass holders now made up greater than 60% of visitation: double what it had in the olden days. And those pass holders in turn often spent more money than single day pass holders over the long run, so while they were spending less per visit, they spend more money overall.

To keep from returning to a heavy debt load, Six Flags put effort into a number of new revenue channels - heavy in park advertising is the most blatant and in your face at Six Flags of almost any facility around. Total capital expenditures for the chain has been capped to roughly 9% of gross revenue by management, meaning that all the parks combine for about $100-120 million in investment. That's rarely enough for gigantic coasters, but then, the parks are chock full of them already. Six Flags has found themselves investing in smaller footprint attractions like flat rides and "gimmick coasters" such as the S&S Free Spin and Larson Giant Loop, but their concerted market effort has generally made these smaller attractions into still being hits. They've also constructed several new dark rides with the Justice League series of attractions, which are shockingly good all around. The chain has also decided to go further into the season than ever before, expanding to Christmas time operation at parks outside of Texas and California, as far north even as Six Flags New England.

FUTURE PROSPECTS:

From a business perspective, Six Flags has one obvious issue - at some point, you can't keep growing the season pass holder base. Conversion to pass holders has slowed down over the years as they've reached maximum market penetration. Converting pass holders to some of their other products, particularly Season Q-Bot and Season Pictures, has been slower going than they'd like. One change made recently was to institute new flavors of their season pass which would come with exclusive benefits like pass holder ride times and exclusive souvenirs. The continued pursuit of new winter events will also demand more indoor attractions, and that may be where their biggest capital expenditures lie in the near future.

2017 saw some appreciable improvements in their operations. Sure, the parks can still be an assault on the senses with neon colored Taki's advertisements, and the food is still grossly overpriced and of middling quality, but it feels like they're becoming better spaces. Many of the most grievous eye sores have been taken care of, and there's real effort from management to take some of that annual reinvestment and plug it into the little things (paint, lights, etc).



Cedar Fair

Market Cap (12/17/17): 3.8 Billion Dollars

Number of Parks: 13

Theme Parks owned/operated & market served: California's Great America (San Francisco), Canada's Wonderland (Toronto), Carowinds (Charlotte), Cedar Point (Detroit, Cleveland, Columbus OH), Dorney Park & Wildwater Kingdom (Philadelphia), Gilroy Gardens (San Francisco), Kings Dominion (Richmond, DC) Kings Island (Cincinnati, Columbus OH), Knott's Berry Farm (Los Angeles), Michigan's Adventure (Grand Rapids, Chicago), Valleyfair (Minneapolis), Worlds of Fun (Kansas City)

Six Flags may beat Cedar Fair in valuation, but after 3 quarters of operations this year, it was Cedar Fair who actually lead in gross revenue. Markets like Cleveland and Grand Rapids may not excite Wall Street in the same way New York City does, but Cedar Fair's superiority in integrated resorts and plans to expand with hotel rooms elsewhere in the chain should. Richard Zimmerman is slated to become the new CEO of the company in 2018 while Matt Ouimet heads to do whatever else it is exactly he wants given that he's been a star in the role. Cedar Fair stock was as low as $6.00 a share in 2009 and has risen to greater than 11x that under his leadership. He's managed to do it without abandoning maintenance and capital expenditures either; all the big parks have seen tremendous investment.

INSIDE BASEBALL BIZ BIZ BIZ TALK:

Cedar Fair under Dick Kinzel was a pretty conservative company doing pretty conservative things; if it worked at Cedar Point, it should work anywhere. Knott's Berry Farm did recover some attendance during the Kinzel-era as coasters were plunked in, but purists were crying and complaining up a storm. The Paramount purchase put a huge debt load on Cedar Fair just as the economy slumped, and Kinzel's choices of capital investment during this time frame were, let's say, sub-optimal (a 10% drop in Cedar Point attendance matched its new for 2008 light show). Pursuing a sale to Apollo wound up getting him the hook, and things have been sweet as boysenberry pie ever since.

Now, I'm not saying that Kinzel was bad; just situationally bad. He didn't really get what Knott's could be as a Disney alternative for the locals, nor was he particularly forward thinking when it came to Cedar Point's resorts and the standards they met. Breakers was basically a dump which was perpetuated as such because practically speaking, hey, we can charge whatever for this, right? Ouimet, with his background at Disney's Parks and Cruise Lines as well as time on the Starwood board was going to have none of this. He sold unnecessary water park assets to tear down Hotel Breakers to the studs and rebuild it, creating a hotel that could charge $200 a night almost every night and still have high occupancy. Knott's classic attractions were rehabbed, and a dark ride reinstalled into a space built for such things. And attendance vaulted, with Cedar Point breaking 3.7 million visitors and Knott's being announced as having 5 million in 2016 on an earnings call.

The business model at Cedar Fair is quality with quantity: the classic all things to all people. Ticket schemes are similar to that of Six Flags, except with higher prices. A Gold Pass at Six Flags Great America which includes entry and parking to the rest of the chain can be had for somewhere in the $65 range. A comparable pass at Cedar Fair is more like $210. Individual visits are still the bulk of their entries. Also like Six Flags, Cedar Fair is full steam ahead on the "renovate things and call them new" bandwagon, as 2018 will see two Rocky Mountain coasters built on 90s era woodies take center stage.

FUTURE PROSPECTS:

It's hard to see the future at Cedar Fair overall as anything but bright: continuing on the same path right now will lead to resorts in Charlotte and Toronto, more winter events, more revenue, and more quality attractions. Like with Six Flags, there's a cap on the market for their pass products, especially at the prices they charge. Also like everyone in this market, they have challenges with staffing. Cedar Point and Valleyfair offer housing for out of area employees, but low wages make them largely noncompetitive for quality employees. Expanding and continuing to improve housing while also improving pay will go far in getting them domestic employees, and expanding the season at many parks in tandem with setting up agreements with other seasonal businesses to transition people into new jobs when the gates close would be enormous. For now, they're years away from that sort of trans-formative move, and you'll find closed rides or food booths at many parks even at the height of the season as a result.



SeaWorld Entertainment

Market Cap (12/17/17): 1.2 Billion Dollars

Theme Parks owned/operated & Market Served:

Busch Gardens Tampa (Tampa, Orlando), Busch Gardens Williamsburg (DC, Richmond), SeaWorld Orlando (Orlando), SeaWorld San Antonio (San Antonio), SeaWorld San Diego (San Diego), Sesame Place (Philadelphia)

If you're here, you know it's been a bad few years for SeaWorld. Here's the good news: they can survive. Their real issue is with a debt load that's been dumped on them by Blackstone. What's that debt? The money Blackstone borrowed to buy them! They still have a high enough attendance level to be sustainable without it, so Chapter 11 sometime in the future is coming. But we're getting ahead of ourselves.

INSIDE BASEBALL BIZ BIZ BIZ TALK:

SeaWorld is going low cost with capital expenditures and there's not much of a 5 year plan. CEO Joel Mamby came from Herschend with a wealth of experience, but he's come into a situation where the company is under seemingly endless federal investigation for all sorts of wrong doing. The initial plan by his predecessor to ignore the wave of anger and resentment towards the brand is all sorts of impossible to overcome. Joel Mamby probably wants you to pray for him, knowing Herschend.

In the meantime, they're looking to compete as "local's parks" rather than destinations and well, good luck to them given that the average household in Orlando's income per capita is actually lower than Detroit's.

FUTURE PROSPECTS:

Hope that Trump doesn't screw up the global economy so bad they can't get investment money from outside to float them while they figure out what to do or let someone else take a nose dive. In fairness, an aggressive strategy could pay off in markets like San Antonio or even San Diego over the long term, but there's no easy path out.



Herschend Family Entertainment

Market Cap (12/17/17): ????? - Herschend is not a public company

Number of Properties: 17 if you count the Harlem Globetrotters

Theme Parks owned/operated & Market Served:

Dollywood (Atlanta, Charlotte), Silver Dollar City (Anywhere in a 300 mile radius of Branson), Wild Adventures (Jacksonville, Tallahassee, Valdosta GA), Stone Mountain Park (Atlanta)

Herschend is all about increasingly integrated resorts in locations where lots of people travel as destinations. They're the Walt Disney World of their vacation lands. They build stuff with theming, they build wild stuff, they build stuff for kids, they have it all. SDC and Dollywood are awesome parks that you can visit darn near year round. I love them. They're so good. So so so good.

INSIDE BASEBALL BIZ BIZ BIZ TALK:

They're private, so they don't talk. They've been building some of the most unique and exciting themed attractions in North America for the last 15 years. Crowds are coming. They have employees that love working for them. They seem to be doing something right. Well, Wild Adventures isn't much but christ, have you ever been? It's in the middle of nowhere. At least they smartly stopped year round operation there. Now just get a new train for Cheetah.

FUTURE PROSPECTS:

Branson is hurting for tourists but SDC still packs em in for now. Of course Dollywood has been headed skyward for as long as I've been into this whole rides for kids nonsense, and they've got a year round hotel there and lord knows what else planned. They're gonna be fine, and more importantly, they aren't selling out to anyone any time soon. God would be pissed.


THE INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS:




Merlin Entertainments

Market Cap (12/17/17): 3.7 Billion Dollars

Number of North American Properties: 30-ish?

Theme Parks owned/operated & Market Served:

Legoland California (San Diego, Los Angeles), Legoland Florida (Central Florida, Tampa), Legoland New York (New York City, opening in 2019)

Merlin made a play for the Busch Gardens parks from SeaWorld earlier this year but were told it was all or nothing. Smart move for SeaWorld, who Merlin honestly should buy and rebrand under the existing "Sea Life" moniker. They've got a lot of parks in Europe and facilities from here to Singapore. No one in North America runs more trackless dark rides, that uber exciting of technology, than Merlin and it isn't even close. Their biggest expansion comes in their "Midway Attraction" department, with acquisitions and operations of Ferris Wheels like the London Eye and the Madame Tussaud's brand.

INSIDE BASEBALL BIZ BIZ BIZ TALK:

They still haven't really made a global play with Merlin's brand as a whole and might never. In fact, they've never made really good regional plays in places like the UK where they could cross promote to engage tourists from their downtown sights into their theme parks (like Alton Towers and Thorpe). There's also some questions that are getting raised about their capacity for upkeep: Colossos is the premier attraction at Heide Park, and it hasn't moved in nearly two years due to maintenance costs that are seen as being prohibitively expensive. It's one thing at Busch Gardens Tampa for Gwazi to sit in the center of the park like a giant pair of wooden failsons. It's another when a chain that isn't struggling has something like that.

FUTURE PROSPECTS:

The kings of Retail Theme Parkery: Legoland, Dungeons, flying theaters, Shrek, and Aquariums are coming to somewhere near you soon if it isn't already. And they'll probably buy someone. Or someones. Multiple someone.



Parque Reunidos

Market Cap (12/17/17): 1.1 Billion Dollars

Number of North American Properties: 36

Theme Parks owned/operated & Market Served:

Kennywood (Pittsburgh), Idlewild Park (Pittsburgh), Lake Compounce (Hartford CT), Storyland (New Hampshire, Boston), Castle Park (Los Angeles/Riverside), Dutch Wonderland (Philadelphia)

Parque Reunidos' list of parks feels like the off brand Merlin to me. I don't know why. They kinda scrapped whatever IPs they had before, but now want to partner up with everyone from Ducati motorcycles to Nickelodeon after thinking harder about it. OK, sure. Just get Garfield out of the Kennywood Old Mill, please.

INSIDE BASEBALL BIZ BIZ BIZ TALK:

Kennywood used to give parks what they needed to get through the season and make improvements as it went along. The parks were great, always well run, and operations rocked. Parque Reunidos gives them a set budget and you better make it last. You can guess the rest of the story.

2018 looks like a year where they're throwing all the past ideas on admission pricing out the window and trying to copy Six Flags. There's many season pass flavors and they all come with different stuff. Expect further cuts in spending at the parks to try and generate a really nice revenue number. What they do with that number? I don't know, more stock offerings? Try to get sold to a Chinese shipping company?

FUTURE PROSPECTS:

They don't seem built for any big moves, and their stock price since 2012 hasn't moved all that much. I'd say they look like a great candidate for a takeover, but there's really only one buyer on the market today and they may be concerned with competing against themselves in some markets. I mean, that's stupid since Merlin owns 4 theme parks that draw from London, but whatever. I'm some jerk on his couch. It might also be that finding financing in the UK right now is tough what with the country on the verge of possibly eating a turd via Brexit.

EVERYBODY ELSE:

Premier Parks Umbrella:




EPR Properties

Market Cap (12/17/17): Total Investments of 6.6 Billion Dollars

Number of Properties: Nearly 400

Theme Parks Owned & Market Served:

Darien Lake (Buffalo), Frontier City (Oklahoma City, Tulsa), Magic Springs (Little Rock), Pacific Park (Los Angeles), Wild Waves (Seattle) [Also owns Pacific Park at Santa Monica Pier, but that is not operated by Premier]

Stanley Kroenke 

Net Worth: $8.1 Billion

Theme Park Owned & Market Served:

Elitch Gardens (Denver)



Premier Parks LLC

Company Value: ??? Million

Theme Park Owned/Operated & Market Served:

Clementon Park (Philadelphia)

It would be easy for me to be hyper critical of Kieran Burke. He was a lawyer, not a park guy, he kinda stumbled into it because of connections that took him to Tierco and the success of Gary Story. Except now Burke is a park guy. I mean, he ran 40 theme parks at his peak. Not many other people have that level of experience. And he loves the business enough to not want to leave. He and Gary went back to Oklahoma and ultimately put a team back together under the old Premier name that would do park operations for CNL Lifestyle, a real estate trust. Gary Story died in 2013, and Burke is running the show and seeming to do a good job as all the CNL parks are still under his leadership even after being divested of.

INSIDE BASEBALL BIZ BIZ BIZ TALK:

CNL Lifestyle was often referred to as a dumpster fire. EPR, meanwhile is adding rides to the parks and generating revenue across the board from its Family Entertainment Center holdings, Ski resorts, and the development and expansion of their TopGolf brand. Premier then gets to manage fun new things at parks like Darien Lake and Magic Springs, the latter of which hadn't had a dry ride addition in something like a decade.

FUTURE PROSPECTS:

Premier has found its niche in the business running parks for just about everyone, even Six Flags (they're operating Waterworld Concord for Seis Banderas). Everything seems rosy right now, especially since their partners aren't averse to spending a little to get a little.



Hershey Entertainment and Resorts Company

Company Value: Billions and Billions and Billions

Theme Parks Owned/Operated & Market Served:

Hersheypark (Eastern Seaboard)

The biggest of all the independents, Hersheypark exceeds 3 million in attendance each year, had a Christmas event light years before anyone north of the Mason-Dixon, and operates a full service resort too (the outrageously nice Hotel Hershey). They're run as a bit of a strange duck as they are part of the Hershey Trust, and everything has to pass muster with the board. The Trust is majority owner of the Hershey chocolate brand, of which something like half the profits all go towards Milton Hershey's school for needy children. If you're thinking, "wow, that must be one helluva school," yes, it is one helluva school. Annually the trust spends $111,000 on each student's education. That board is conservative about expansions, which is probably why Hersheypark has a water park smack dab in the center of it included with admission rather than connected and charging a separate fee and making all the money ever.

Hershey Resorts, previously known as HERCO, has also owned and operated other parks than Hershey at various points. This includes Lake Compounce and Dutch Wonderland. Right now, they don't seem to be looking to making acquisitions, but when you have hundreds of millions at your disposal, things happen sometimes.



Apex Parks Group

Company Value: ??? Million

Theme Parks Owned/Operated & Markets Served:

Fantasy Island (Buffalo), Indiana Beach (Indianapolis, Chicago)

Looking to become the newest conglomerate is Apex Parks; Founded by former Six Flags Great America GM Al Weber, the company is now in the hands of another Six Flags GM, John Fitzgerald following Mr. Weber's sudden and untimely death in 2016. Backed by private capital, Apex is actively looking to make acquisitions in the Family Entertainment Center, Water Park, and Amusement Park space. Their biggest purchase to date was Indiana Beach; once a beloved wacky boardwalk park plunked in the Midwest, life after sale from its family owners was harsh. Apex swooped in and grabbed it, giving the park new lease on life. Martin's Fantasy Island followed last year, and it's very likely that it's only just the start.

The Koch Family

Net Worth: Honestly, they probably don't talk to one another, don't even think of combining it

Theme Parks Owned/Operated & Markets Served:

Holiday World - Koch Development Corporation (Louisville, Evansville, Indianapolis) / Alabama Splash Adventure  - Pat, Dan, Natalie Koch (Birmingham AL)

Until June 16, 2010, the Koch Family appeared as the model of normalcy for a family run operation. Will Koch ran Holiday World, taking over from his parents Pat and Bill who had founded it in the 1950s. Will was a beloved figure with a penchant for aggressive roller coasters and clean parks; both won him many awards and international acclaim, and a park in the middle of nowhere Indiana wound up beating Six Flags into submission and exceeding 1 million attendees annually. Will Koch died that day while swimming, presumably the result of diabetic shock and everything changed. His brother and sister attempted to regain the park from Will's wife via legal means and were turned back at the courts. An attempt to take over Kentucky Kingdom and reduce it to a water park as a backup plan for them also flopped. Refusing to leave the industry, the matriarch of the family made some phone calls, and soon Dan, Natalie, and a host of managers from Holiday World made their way to Alabama to run the constantly floundering Alabama Splash Adventure. Holiday World, meanwhile, seems to be trucking along just fine with Will's children working in the park and preparing to take it over for the next generation.



Fun Spot

Theme Parks Owned/Operated & Markets Served:

Fun Spot Orlando & Kissimmee (Central Florida), Fun Junction USA (Atlanta)

Another FEC gone big and looking to make purchases is Fun Spot, who bought out Fun Junction USA this year and is planning big expansions in the Florida market. Comments made at IAAPA suggest that they purchased wood coasters from GCI and Gravity Group to see which they liked best, and they seem to think it is a situational sort of thing.




Triple 5 Group

Theme Parks Owned/Operated & Markets Served

Nickelodeon Universe (Minneapolis), Galaxyland (Edmonton), Nickelodeon Universe @ American Dream (New York City/Newark)

The Ghermezian family has billions in assets built around gigantic malls. Of course they were the folks who were able to actually finish Xanadu in the Meadowlands. Of course they already own and run the two most significant indoor theme parks in the hemisphere. In fairness, just saying they own malls doesn't totally describe the variation in what they develop (there's sections about biotechnology and nuclear energy on their site) but for what we're talking about, sure. They do malls. American Dream will open with a full theme park and some gnarly Gerstlauer built coasters as well as a Legoland Discovery Center, indoor ski hill, and Sea Life Aquarium.

And the fully independents:

Knoebel Family (Knoebels Grove, Pennsylvania)

Lagoon Corporation (Lagoon, Salt Lake City)

Nick Laskaris (Mt. Olympus, Wisconsin Dells, WI)

Santa Cruz Seaside Company (Santa Cruz Beach Boardwalk, California)



Jack and Will Morey (Morey's Piers, NJ)

Landry's Inc./Fertitta Family (Kemah Boardwalk, Downtown Aquarium, and Historic Galveston Pleasure Pier, TX)

Standard Amusements (Operator of Rye Playland, NY)



Central Amusements (Operator of Luna Park and Victorian Gardens, NYC. A subsidiary of Italian ride manufacturer Zamperla)

Gary Norton (Silverwood, Idaho)

Maritime Fun Group (Burlington Amusement Park, Shining Waters, Sandspit; all in Prince Edward Island, Canada)

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Part 4 will complete the series with a look to the future; What projects are in the works in the regional park scene? More importantly: will any of them actually come to fruition?

Saturday, December 16, 2017

Regional Theme Park Industry 101, Part 2: How?

In Part One, we detailed what the regional theme park industry was and how it got started. In Part Two, we look at the development of the business to the present day to see how companies evolved, grew, and shrunk.
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By the 1990s, regional park consolidation had created four significant players; Time Warner's Six Flags, Paramount Parks, Anheuser Busch, and lowly Cedar Fair. Six Flags was bought and sold multiple times at this point, being a subsidiary of Bally's and Penn Central at various points. Time Warner saw the potential in using the theme park chain to promote their IPs and made a steal of the chain, acquiring it in full by 1993 and investing heavily into the facilities with real success. Paramount had wound up with Taft Broadcasting's parks after the company was the target of a hostile takeover from, what else, a guy with no actual entertainment experience but plenty in the realm of convenience stores (he ran it into the ground and lost $560 million in the process). Paramount similarly saw the same opportunity Walt had to promote offerings in the 1950s drop into their laps across a multitude of markets. AB hadn't really planned on running a theme park empire, but when HBJ Inc. sold them the SeaWorld chain in 1989, they had some of the most beloved facilities in the country. And then there was Cedar Fair: they were the little guys. Dick Kinzel was a mere popcorn salesman when he started there in the 1970s, and he rose through the ranks to CEO, masterminding the takeovers of Worlds of Fun (70s themer) and Dorney Park (traditional amusement park).



There were still, however, a number of smaller operators throughout the United States. While most major markets had been consumed, a number of smaller or developing markets were still run outside the chains: Denver, Buffalo, Seattle, and Boston, just to name a few. As the 80s and 90s progressed, real estate development had driven the cost of real estate in these markets higher, while skilled unionized labor to build the parks had equally kept creeping up. There were no great changes to make acquisition and construction more efficient than it had been in the 50s; there still aren't any either. New construction was largely impractical, and when it was being attempted, was failing even harder than it had in the 70s. Alfa Smartparks development of Jazzland and Visionland was a total flop. Only Elitch Gardens, which had been given land by the city of Denver and a package of incentives to relocate downtown, built a "new" park, even then mostly with used rides from their prior location. There were opportunities there for someone with deep pockets.



Gary Story was a theme park lifer who wound up in charge of a small facility in Oklahoma known as Frontier City. He wasn't intended to run it forever; just long enough to get through a season before it could be sold off and dismantled for residential real estate. Instead, he managed to balloon attendance. The owners, a company called Tierco, was primarily in the oil business, but Story's unexpected success opened their minds to the potential in theme parks. Behind Story and a young Harvard Law grad named Kieran Burke, Tierco changed names to Premier Parks and decided to make a go of the thing themselves. Their strategy for expansion was bold: acquire parks, make significant upgrades to the facilities, watch money roll in. In 1995, Premier made its first big move, acquiring Funtime Parks Inc. and with it four parks with "Lake" in the name: Geauga, Compounce, Wyandot, and Darien. Not much is remembered about Funtime, but they had been birthed of ex-Cedar Point management and investors, and had brought such innovations as season pass acceptance across a chain to the US theme park industry. With Premier's purchase of Funtime, they immediately became a real player. But this was only a prelude of things to come.



In 1996 and 1997, Premier Parks spread like wildfire, assuming debt in return for purchases of Riverside Park, Marine World, Kentucky Kingdom, Great Escape, Waterworld USA, and Elitch Gardens. In three years, Premier Parks had grown into the second largest regional park operator behind only Six Flags. Burke and Story's plans had been working too - capital investment continuously resulted in double digit attendance growth. Return on investment for new attractions went from half a decade to just a single season. Looking for a park that could be a centerpiece for their growing empire, Story and Burke approached Time Warner with the possibility of taking over operations of Six Flags over Texas in 1997 and buying into its independent ownership group. At some point, the question came up: "What if we wanted the whole chain?" On April 1, 1998, David bought Goliath, and Premier Parks became the undisputed king of the regional theme park world. The expansion continued on into 2002, with the acquisition of Europe's Walibi Parks chain, Jazzland, Wild Waves in Washington, La Ronde in Montreal, Fiesta Texas, SeaWorld Ohio, and Mexico City's Reino Aventura.



Capital expenditure came hot and heavy at their new parks; Geauga Lake alone was subject to well over $100 million dollars of investment overall between 1999 and 2002. And in the short term, things looked great: Geauga's attendance in 2000 was up 42% year over year. Creating debt is not necessarily an issue if one knows that they can pay it off - think of the average mortgage, for example. But repaying the loans quickly became an issue for Story and Burke, as attendance plateaued in 2001 and began to falter in 2002. By 2003, attendance chain wide was in free fall. The huge initial gains driven by the ride construction proved incapable of retaining guests. But why?

General orthodoxy in the theme park world is that Six Flags' rapid decline was the result not of poor attraction choices, but perhaps of too many and too soon. Revolutionizing the industry to create a new fleet of super parks required far too many managers, maintenance crews, and operations staff with experience, as well as too many new front line employees too quickly for the chain's human resources and recruiting departments to possibly catch up. Six Flags Great Adventure's 1999 expansion was called "The War on Lines," featuring twenty-seven new rides. Without proper staff to run or maintain them, rides like the Evolution sometimes went literally years between days of operation. Today, 14 of the 27 rides remain at the park, with most of the adult attractions having been removed and the kiddie rides being shuffled around and re-skinned multiple times.

The events at Great Adventure were not a unique occurrence: Six Flags Magic Mountain's 2001 headliner X never opened that year. Six Flags Ohio opened 4 roller coasters for the 2000 season, but found the park largely incapable of operating more than one train on their coasters at any given time while their attendance crested 2 million. Physical infrastructure also had not been upgraded to deal with the crowds: bathroom and water fountains were either not built to accommodate the throngs or outright removed as part of expansion efforts. Six Flags America to this day suffers from a lack of bathroom or food facilities in half the park as the Premier regime simply never considered it important to run plumbing back to its most popular attractions and themed areas. The volume of work done also meant much of it was unfinished at opening: one trip report on rec.roller-coaster speaking on Six Flags America's opening day stated the blacktop sidewalks caught fire due to not properly curing.

A perfect storm was brewing for Six Flags; meanwhile, Viacom was in the mood to split itself up and send a new IPO into the world (CBS Corporation). As part of the restructuring, lots of non-core assets had to get shuttled off to make way for revenue that would please the shareholders holding onto Viacom stock. Paramount's theme parks were just such a asset. The only problem for Viacom is that they were selling the asset into a buyer's market. Six Flags divested itself first of its European parks, followed by its Ohio properties in early 2004 to Cedar Fair to raise cash for debt service, taking a huge loss in the process. They were in no position whatsoever to make the acquisition of a successful park brand, and had eliminated most of the other market players during their rise. Anheuser-Busch was out there, but to call AB poorly run in 2004/2005 would be a vast understatement, and they passed. Private capital aside (Blackstone owned controlling interest in Universal Orlando meant they were busy; Apollo and Vanguard seemingly passed the opportunity up), there was just one other player available. Cedar Fair had somehow managed itself competently enough to have a reasonable debt load and a fine history of operating amusement and theme parks. Competent enough that they could borrow the $1.25 billion dollars necessary.



America's Great Recession only worsened things for Six Flags, shuttering Astroworld for a cash infusion and seeing a shareholder revolt as a result. Mark Shapiro came in to run the company on behalf of Washington Racial Slurs owner Dan Snyder, and attempted to perform a family friendly facelift on Six Flags. To fund this, Shapiro ditched many of its smaller market parks to rot (Kentucky Kingdom, New Orleans) or private capital (the properties like Darien Lake which wound up with CNL), and sought to reinforce their largest key markets with more extensively themed attractions. The gambit bore some fruit: per capita spending increased, but attendance continued to stay static or drop, with new attractions built often not meeting the expectations of the general public. Six Flags' Dark Knight indoor mouse coasters were a prime example of this - the ride's preshow elements and theming were some of the best attempted by the chain in over a decade, but the ride itself (a production model Mack mouse housed indoors) didn't meet the expectations of those waiting long periods of time.

In 2009, Six Flags filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. That same year, Cedar Fair announced plans after multiple years of poor stock performance to be acquired by Apollo Management. InBev had taken over in St. Louis and divested of the Busch parks to pay back the debt to Blackstone; Blackstone's intent was to spin the parks off into public offering and fill the new corporation with debt. Kennywood Corporation too, a proud family business, was consumed by foreign money as it was integrated into Parque Reunidos' Palace Entertainment arm in 2007. The period between 1997 and 2001 had become known in enthusiast circles as "The Coaster Wars"; now clearly over, it seemed that no one had really won.



Quietly during 2007, Herschend Family Entertainment began to make a series of acquisition. First was Wild Adventures in Valdosta, GA, a theme park which opened in the 1990s and never found its legs in spite of expanding quickly to have ten roller coasters and safari attraction. They also purchased two large aquariums in the Cincinnati and Philadelphia metro areas. Herschend had been steadily increasing their overall portfolio for some time, building water parks to complement their theme parks in Branson and Pigeon Forge while eliminating their competition in Branson via acquisition and closure. Expansions became much more aggressive with bigger themed areas, intellectual property rights, and the kind of large roller coasters the chain had never before built. Their success was such that many of the temporary entrants in the industry sought their assistance: CNL placed many of their parks under their management during the late 2000s.



Another recent entrant to the North American market was Merlin Entertainments; in fairness, they're recent to exist. Merlin was a small time player until Blackstone acquired them in 2005 and ramped up investment, merging a number of European companies into them. LEGO's theme park division was one of these acquisitions, and Merlin began its movement into the US market first in California at the existing Legoland park, followed by the acquisition of Cypress Gardens and its rebranding to the nation's second such facility in 2011. Merlin had other ideas though beyond just building big new theme parks: expanding existing brands like The Dungeon and Madame Tussauds was certainly one, but they went back to the idea of an arcade-amusement facility hybrid experimented with since the 1970s under the LEGO branding. 12 Legoland Discovery Centers have popped up in retail areas around the US and Canada, each offering things like 4D cinemas and trackless dark rides.

The early part of the 2010s saw an economic recovery, and with it a new clarity in the theme park landscape. Cedar Fair's leadership was changed and the shareholders retained control, successfully managing to prevent Apollo from taking over. Six Flags emerged from bankruptcy with some adjusted strategies and much, much less debt. Others were on shakier foundations: SeaWorld was healthy and turning fine profits until the emergence of the film Blackfish, and began to make appeals for foreign investment that led to Chinese minority ownership in 2017. Hard Rock Park came and went. Parque Reunidos was traded between private equity firms, as were most of the CNL Lifestyle Properties.



Experimentation over the lean years had led to the return of some old ideas and the institution of some new ones. In the early 20th century, rides were frequently rethemed or added on to in order to create budget conscious new attractions annually. Six Flags' gamble with a thorough redevelopment of the Texas Giant at it's Arlington, TX park brought Rocky Mountain Coasters to the forefront of innovation in the industry, but also proved that a significant re-imagining of a ride beyond a mere name change or re-theme could seriously improve attendance and pass sales. Lodging was renovated (Hotel Breakers at Cedar Point) or constructed (Great Escape in NY, Lake Compounce in CT). Seasonal parks, starting with Herschend and Six Flags Over Texas, expanded their seasons from summer operation to many running March or April to New Years. Virtually all have also followed the "festival" blueprint of EPCOT and SeaWorld as well to increase return visitation. Dark rides have started to find their way back in with Sally's Justice League and Triotech's Iron Reef and Wonder Mountain attractions, and extended seasons may further push the need for more indoor attractions yet such as flying theaters.

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In Part Three, we look at the "who" of the industry with the major and minor players, operators, owners, and more.




Tuesday, December 12, 2017

Regional Theme Park Industry 101, Part 1: What?

Here on Parkscope and across the Orlando/Cali-centric theme park internet spaces, most pieces revolve around the existence of the two primary chains (Universal and Disney) and their year round operating facilities. There's good reason for this economically: They are the highest performing parks in the World, have huge customer bases who grit their teeth for any announcement, no matter how small, and thus generate ad income, views, replies, and all the usual things necessary to motivate individuals to keep working on writing pieces about them. The market, has, ostensibly, spoken.

What isn't so well understood is the regional amusement/theme park operations in the United States. That's not to say that there isn't knowledge about it out there. There are a lot of people who know that the primary players are Herschend, Cedar Fair, Six Flags, SeaWorld, and Palace Entertainment. But how did those become the primary figures? Why are the parks the way they are? You know, centered around roller coasters instead of big dark rides? Why aren't there more parks being built? This series will attempt to inform you as best we can.

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First off, let's make something perfectly clear: the regional theme park scene is an evolution of the regional amusement park scene. In many cases, these parks which were born out of the trolley parks of the late 19th century. Cedar Point, Lake Compounce, Six Flags New England, the deceased Geauga Lake, and Kennywood were literally these sorts of facilities. Kings Island, Elitch Gardens, and Adventureland in Iowa, meanwhile, are more spiritual descendants who are the result of their traditionalist fore bearer being consumed and eliminated. However, that these parks are regional in scope rather than national is not entirely what was desired by their creators. And that is an extremely important part of the story around which everything else rotates.

The basic summary of the genesis of the theme park industry that you'll read almost anywhere is that after the success of Disneyland, several attempts at copying came and went rather quickly. Freedomland is generally a prime example. Depending on the narrative being pushed, either everyone else ever failed from that point because none of them had the success of Eisner-era Disney's growth, or there was an explosion of parks and the story basically ends there because no one saw through the maturation and consolidation periods of the industry in written form. The parks we recognize today as being Six Flags' properties consist of three purpose built Six Flags facilities under the vision of the Wynne Family (Over Texas, Over Georgia, St. Louis), who also has significant financial interest in two of them. Cedar Fair has never constructed a new gate, buying and selling parks over the years beginning with the acquisition of Valleyfair in 1978. Those two operators, in spite of only being responsible for actually producing 4 parks into existence, represent the present operations of 25 "dry" parks with 20 separate founding groups. Add in the parks they've shuttered in the last 15 years (Astroworld, Geauga, New Orleans), and all three of those were constructed by 3 more entirely separate founding groups. If that wasn't enough, Six Flags can claim 4 more branches on their family tree thanks to their water park division.

2 operators. 27 different founders for their parks. How did this happen?



To answer this, we need to go back in time to the boom. 15 of the 25 dry parks owned by Six Flags and Cedar Fair were constructed between 1961 and 1975. 11 of those opened between the years of 1971 and 1976. This is a period of growth in the theme park industry we will simply never see again representing a paradigm shift of amusements away from urban cores to suburbia along with the white people fleeing the inner cities. The idea of following these crowds was, of course, part of the attraction - parks sought to be built near large shopping and residential developments and with excellent access to interstates, but with enough mass as to make them effectively impossible to NIMBY from noise complaints and the like. And virtually every one of these parks was built with the promise of becoming the new Disneyland with Disneyland like attendance and effects to the local economy.



The problem is, of course, that none of these parks were as successful. Disneyland had an incredibly prime location near Los Angeles, guaranteeing it great weather for much of the year. Most parks built in this era didn't have that benefit. Many of those which did have good weather - Busch Gardens California and Texas, for example, or Marco Polo Park near Jacksonville, FL - found their real estate being more valuable for other developments, and they closed up in short order. Most parks were in areas with strong winters, making them seasonal propositions who are deeply challenged at attaining enough revenue in a limited season.



These parks didn't necessarily fail because they lacked intellectual properties that were recognizable to the public or because they lacked innovative and themed attractions either. Most featured large indoor rides or walk through attractions which were actually quite impressive for the time, and the likes of Hanna Barbera and Looney Tunes were regularly licensed for use at these facilities. KECO, the developers of Kings Island, Kings Dominion, and Canada's Wonderland, was in fact a branch of the media company Taft Communications, who used the parks to promote programs appearing on their slates of networks as well as leveraging their position to gain promotion via television productions. The Brady Bunch famously nearly died on Kings Islands' Racer while filming an episode at the park. The parks weren't bad, and they weren't "glorified carnivals". They generally had a theme or series of them and stuck to them. They ranged from Jules Verne's Around the World in 80 Days (Worlds of Fun, Kansas City), the Li'l Abner comic strip (Dogpatch USA), to, well, America (Great America in California and Illinois).



The simple reality is that most of the parks were developed by businessmen who simply didn't understand the theme park industry. The costs of development were as high or higher due to the inflated valuation of land acquisition and labor costs compared to places like Central Florida, making the parks equally or more expensive to develop initially and costly to maintain in their opening state in perpetuity. The sheer volume of cash burn in the theme park industry, something that was well outside the knowledge base of many institutional investors with real estate or entertainment backgrounds who entered the space, drove many an aspiring operator who hadn't outright failed at turning an initial profit off: Marriott (Great America) and Harcourt (SeaWorld) are probably the most well known examples of such corporations. Other park operators (Carowinds, for example) simply came nowhere near to the marks suggested because of a combination of poor attraction choices, wrong/still developing market, or poor timing (The OPEC Oil Crises of 1973 and 1979 also overlaps this time period).



Spending untold sums of money for upkeep on legacy attractions while locals demanded constant updates was a serious concern and challenge for the new themers. While Disney had made its name with family friendly indoor attractions like the Haunted Mansion and Pirates of the Caribbean, early attempts at copying that success for the regional operators simply hadn't panned out. What was panning out was the roller coaster, and it was a mighty fine time to start investing in those. Arrow's development of tubular steel track in 1959 directly led to a number of huge innovations in coaster design. While Disney was afraid to install large thrill rides, regional parks looked at the cost/benefit ratio and realized that building inverting roller coasters was the only rational path for them. They had already generally buried their traditional park competition at this point, and the markets demanded that the thrill ride space be filled. And it was: New and Huge won the day, with Dinn/Summers and RCCA constructing massive wood coasters and Arrow and Vekoma building enormous twisted steel creations. Mind you, most of it sucked, but was huge and drew.

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In Part Two, we get into the "How?" - The rise and fall of Six Flags, the ascendancy of Cedar Fair, private capital ruining everything, and some guys with a cave.